현대에는 감각소여와 같은 특별한 내적 존재자를 지각의 대상으로 받아들이는 철학자는 많지 않다. 그렇다면 외적 대상의 지각적 현존가능성은 더 이상 아무런 문제가 없는가? 알바 노에는 감각소여를 부정하지만 그럼에도 불구하고 외적 대상의 현존가능성을 설명하는 문제를 심각하게 받아들인다. 외적 대상의 지각이 보다 기초적인 지각에 의해 설명되어야만 한다는 노에의 요청은 비판의 여지가 있지만 그러한 문제 제기의 배경에 보존되어야 할 중요한 진리가 있다. 이 논문의 목적은 그 중요한 진리를 보존하면서도 노에의 문제제기 자체는 피할 수 있음을 보이는 데 있다. 이러한 작업은 결국 현존에 대한 포용적 견해에 (...) 동기를 부여할 것이다. (shrink)

My dissertation is concerned with some recent attempts to develop a naturalistic account of perceptual judgement as a step towards a solution of the metaphysical problem of intentionality. Broadly speaking, two naturalistic approaches to this issue can be found in the recent literature: the causal theories of Fodor and others, and the teleological account of Millikan and Papineau. I present both approaches, and exhibit one common problem facing these accounts. The common problem is what I call, "The Problem of Multiple (...) Contents." Crudely speaking, the problem for a causal theory of perceptual content is that normally there are multiple causal links between an object and the perception of it. What is special about the cup that makes it the object of perception? A parallel problem occurs for the teleological theory which emphasizes the effects of a perceptual state for the determination of its object. I argue that the above accounts don't have enough resources to single out a unique intentional content. ;I turn next to Dretske's account, which combines elements of and , an account centered on the notion of "indication function". Dretske's sophisticated account turns out, after a careful examination, not to be completely free from the problem that afflicts and . ;In the final chapter of my dissertation, I propose a strategy for solving the problem of multiple contents. My proposal is based on the observation that perceptual objects are often what we interact with not only through sensory transactions, but also through behavior. Sensory information from the objects located in a perceiver's environment guides his behavior, and which in turn make an impact on the environment, in particular, on those very objects which triggered the perceptually guided behavior. There is something special about the object of perception in that it lies at the intersection of the sensory causal chain and the behavioral chain. Much work needs to be done before this strategy will yield a full account of intentionality. Nevertheless, I argue that it is a promising approach to the problem of multiple contents. (shrink)

For the purpose of this paper, I take it for granted that subjectivity is an essential character of perceptual experience. What I take issue with is the further claim that subjectivity of experience tends to support the view that phenomenal characters are intrinsic properties of experience. A criticism of the claim can be presented from the perspective of representationalism according to which phenomenal character is a kind of representational character. But representationalism fails to do justice to the fact that from (...) the subjective point of view, we seem to be directly aware of mind-independent objects in the world. A stronger criticism canbe based on the disjunctivist’s view of experience that best accommodates direct awareness of the external world. But disjunctivism rejects the common kind that also seems from the subject’s point of view to be shared by veridical perception and hallucination. The crucial problem is whether disjunctivists can make sense of the phenomenology of hallucination. Focusing the discussion on Martin’s epistemic version of disjunctivism, I hope to show the relevance of solving this problem for a better understanding of the subjectivity of experience. (shrink)